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Chevron Deference to Agency
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In Chevron v National Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
Supreme Court resolved a long-standing dispute by holding that
courts must defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous statute.' But in resolving that important conflict, the
Court prompted many questions regarding the scope of this rule
of deference. One of these unanswered questions is how courts
should regard agency interpretations of statutes where the
interpretation delimits the scope of the agency's jurisdiction. An
agency makes what is arguably a jurisdictional interpretation
when, for example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion interprets Title VII to apply extraterritorially,2 the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission asserts authority to adju-
dicate counterclaims,3 or the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration interprets a statute mandating protection for all
workers as applying only to the manufacturing sector.4 General-
ly, the law does not permit those limited by a statute to deter-
mine the scope of that limitation,5 but the conflict between this
t BA . 1991, Bucknell University; J.D. 1994, The University of Chicago.
1 467 US 837 (1984).
2 See EEOC v Arabian Oil Co., 499 US 244 (1991).
' See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833 (1986).
See Dole v United Steelworkers of America, 494 US 26 (1990).
s See Norman J. Singer, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 65.02 (Clark
Boardman Callaghan, 5th ed 1992) ("[Ihe general rule applied to statutes granting
powers to [agencies] is that only those powers are granted which are conferred either
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interpretive principle and Chevron's rule of deference has pro-
duced varying resolutions in the lower courts and even among
members of the Supreme Court.
This Comment argues that under Chevron, courts should
defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute even
if the interpretation delimits the scope of the agency's jurisdic-
tion. Section I examines Chevron and the major rationales that
have been proffered for it. Section II examines the Supreme
Court's treatment of agency interpretations that raise jurisdic-
tional issues, and shows, as a descriptive matter, that the Court
has extended the Chevron framework to jurisdictional interpreta-
tions. It then examines the lower courts' treatment of the issue.
Section III argues that courts should extend Chevron deference to
an agency's interpretation of a statute delimiting its jurisdiction.
A rule of deference both recognizes the problems in distinguish-
ing jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional interpretations and best
upholds the policies behind Chevron.
I. CHEVRON AND ITS RATIONALES
In Chevron,6 the Court established a two-part test for re-
viewing agency interpretations of statutes. The first question is
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."7 If a "court
determines that Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue," it must proceed to step two: "[I]f the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the ques-
tion for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute."'
Commentators have offered a number of rationales for the
Chevron opinion. Some treat Chevron as merely creating a de-
fault rule against which Congress can legislate;9 others argue
expressly or by necessary implication."). See also Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev 2071, 2097 (1990), citing Federalist 78 (Hamilton) and
Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137, 176 (1803).
' Chevron has become a defining case in administrative law-described as a "kind of
Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the administrative state." Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at
2075.
7 467 US at 842-43.
8 Id at 843.
' See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 Duke L J 511, 516-17.
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that the separation-of-powers doctrine requires Chevron defer-
ence to agency interpretations," and still others treat Chevron
as an attempt to reconstruct congressional intent." Since the prin-
ciples behind the doctrine may influence whether Chevron should
apply in a given situation, a survey of the major rationales for
deference can help to evaluate the desirability of applying Chev-
ron to jurisdictional questions.
Justice Scalia is the most prominent proponent of the de-
fault-rule view of Chevron. In his well-known article in the Duke
Law Journal, Justice Scalia remarked,
In the vast majority of cases I expect that Congress neither
(1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant to confer discre-
tion upon the agency, but rather (3) didn't think about the
matter at all. If I am correct in that, then any rule adopted
in this field represents merely a fictional, presumed intent,
and operates principally as a background rule against which
Congress can legislate. 2
Under this view, Chevron improves upon previous doctrine in
that "Congress now knows that the ambiguity it creates, whether
intentionally, or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the
bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a
particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be
known."
13
Another view of Chevron holds that separation of powers
requires the deference doctrine. Commentators have argued that
resolving the ambiguities that arise in Chevron disputes neces-
sarily involves policy judgments. Since policy judgments are prop-
erly the domain of the political branches, "democratically ac-
countable officials" should interpret statutes. 4 Chevron there-
fore upholds separation of powers by shifting interpretive power
over ambiguous statutes to agencies, which are democratically
accountable, from the courts, which are less so.
Finally, a third view grounds Chevron in legislative intent.
On this view, Congress intended the agencies, and not the courts,
to make reasonable interpretations of statutory ambiguities.
1" See Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 Admin L J 269, 277-78, 283-85 (1988); Kenneth W. Starr,
Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Yale J Reg 283, 308, 312 (1986).
n See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2085-91 (cited in note 5).
Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 517 (cited in note 9).
13 Id.
14 Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 307-09, 312 (cited in note 10).
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Chevron states: "If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agen-
cy to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency
to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation."'5
II. THE TREATMENT OF AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS INVOLVING
THE SCOPE OF THE AGENCY'S JURISDICTION
A. Mississippi Power and Schor
In Mississippi Power and Light Co. v Mississippi, the Court
held that an order of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) requiring an electric utility to purchase an amount of a
nuclear power plant's output at rates FERC determined to be
'just and reasonable" preempted an inquiry by the Mississippi
Public Service Commission.'6 All Justices agreed that if FERC
had jurisdiction over the matter, then the state proceedings were
preempted. The question of jurisdiction, however, divided the
Court.
. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, simply stated that
FERC's jurisdiction "ha[d] been established," and did not address
Chevron's relation to the jurisdictional interpretation.' Justice
Scalia, in a concurring opinion, directly faced the question of the
appropriate level of deference courts should grant agency inter-
pretations delimiting their jurisdiction. He argued that the Court
had held that Chevron "applies to an agency's interpretation of a
statute designed to confine its authority," and concluded that "it
is settled law that the rule of deference applies even to an
agency's interpretation of its own statutory authority or jurisdic-
tion."
is
Scalia offered three arguments for deferring to jurisdictional
interpretations. First, deference is "necessary because there is no
discernible line between an agency's exceeding its authority and
an agency's exceeding authorized application of its authority ....
Virtually any administrative action can be characterized as ei-
ther the one or the other, depending upon how generally one
wishes to describe the 'authority.'"' Second, "deference [in juris-
dictional matters] is appropriate because it is consistent with the
general rationale for deference: Congress would naturally expect
1 467 US at 843-44.
'6 487 US 354, 356-57 (1988).
17 Id at 374.
Id at 380-81.
Id at 381 (Scalia concurring) (emphasis omitted).
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that the agency would be responsible, within broad limits, for re-
solving statutory authority or jurisdiction."20 Finally, Scalia not-
ed that "Congress would neither anticipate nor desire that every
ambiguity in statutory authority would be addressed, de novo, by
the courts."2'
After noting that he would defer to FERC's claim of exclusive
jurisdiction in this case if Chevron applied,' Justice Brennan
rejected use of the deference principle in jurisdictional situations:
"Our agency deference cases have always been limited to statutes
the agency was 'entrusted to administer.' Agencies do not
'administer' statutes confining the scope of their jurisdiction, and
such statutes are not 'entrusted' to agencies."' Justice Brennan
offered three arguments to support his claim. "First, statutes
confining an agency's jurisdiction do not reflect conflicts between
policies that have been committed to the agency's care, but rath-
er reflect policies in favor of limiting the agency's jurisdic-
tion .... ."' Second, Brennan argued that "[an agency] can claim
no special expertise in interpreting a statute confining its juris-
diction."' Finally, he suggested that "we cannot presume that
Congress implicitly intended an agency to fill 'gaps' in a statute
confining the agency's jurisdiction, since by its nature such a
statute manifests an unwillingness to give the agency the free-
dom to define the scope of its own power."2" Brennan concluded
that it was "not surprising that this Court has never deferred to
an agency's interpretation of a statute designed to confine the
scope of its own jurisdiction."27 Unfortunately, Mississippi Power
represents the end as well as the beginning of the Scalia-
Brennan dispute over the propriety of deference to jurisdictional
interpretations. The two justices did not continue the debate in
subsequent cases, and the Court has not explicitly resolved the issue.'
Since Chevron, the Court has not faced a clearer example of
a jurisdictional interpretation than it did in Commodity Futures
Id at 382 (emphasis omitted).
21 Id.
2 Id at 386 (Brennan dissenting).
23 Id at 386-87.
24 Id at 387. Policies in favor of limiting the agency's jurisdiction, "by definition, have
not been entrusted to the agency and [ I] may indeed conflict not only with the statutory
policies the agency has been charged with advancing but also with the agency's institu-
tional interests in expanding its own power." Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
' See Dole v United Steelworkers of America, 494 US 26, 54-55 (1990).
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Trading Commission v Schor, a case which turned on an explicit
assertion of jurisdiction.' Section 14 of the Commodity Ex-
change Act (CEA) provides that any person injured by a commod-
ity broker's violation of the Act or Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) regulations may apply to the CFTC for repa-
rations.0 The CFTC issued a regulation asserting the authority
to adjudicate counterclaims along with the original claims in repa-
rations hearings.3' Citing Chevron, the Court upheld the
agency's assertion of jurisdiction.32
There was no question that the CFTC's interpretation of
Section 14 expanded its jurisdiction. The Court's reasons for
upholding the jurisdictional grab, however, were not so clear. The
Court claimed to be following Chevron's step one; it found that
Congress intended the CFTC to have this authority.' "Congress
explicitly affirmed the CFTC's authority to dictate the scope of its
counterclaim jurisdiction .... ' However, other language in the
opinion suggests that courts should defer to jurisdictional inter-
pretations-even where Congressional intent is ambiguous. The
Court stated that "the Court of Appeals was incorrect to state on
the facts of this case that the CFTC's expertise was not deserving
of deference because of the '[ ] jurisdictional' nature of the ques-
tion at issue."35 This language suggests that in at least some
cases deference to an agency's jurisdictional interpretation is
appropriate.
2 478 US 833 (1986).
s 7 USC § 18(a) (1988).
31 478 US at 837, citing 17 CFR § 12.23(b)(2) (1983).
3 According to the Court:
[Tihe CFTC's long-held position that it has the power to take jurisdiction over coun-
terclaims ... is eminently reasonable and well within the scope of its delegated au-
thority. Accordingly, as the CFTC's contemporaneous interpretation of the statute it
is entrusted to administer, considerable weight must be accorded the CFTC's posi-
tion.
478 US at 844.
Id at 847.
' Id at 846. The Court further divined congressional approval from the statutory lan-
guage, which authorized the Commission to "promulgate such rules, regulations, and or-
ders as it deems necessary.... ." Id at 846, citing 7 USC § 18(b) (1988). Also, the Court
stated that "[sluch deference is especially warranted here, for Congress has twice amend-
ed the CEA since the CFTC declared by regulation that it would exercise jurisdiction over
counterclaims arising out of the same transaction as the principal reparations dispute but
has not overruled the CFTC's assertion of jurisdiction." 478 US at 845-46.
' 478 US at 845, quoting Schor v Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 740 F2d
1262, 1279 (DC Cir 1984).
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B. Other Supreme Court Cases
In the wake of Mississippi Power and Schor, it remains un-
clear what standard, if any, the Court has adopted. Since Chev-
ron, the Court has examined a number of agency interpretations
that raise jurisdictional issues, even though it has not acknowl-
edged them as such. This Section reviews these cases to show
that the Court continued to apply Chevron deference even when
an agency interpretation involved jurisdictional elements.
While Section III argues that courts cannot coherently distin-
guish jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional interpretations, the
following cases contain what courts and commentators have rec-
ognized as at least having a strong jurisdictional element. A brief
examination of these cases is important for three reasons. First,
to the extent these cases do involve jurisdictional interpretations,
their decisions may control later cases involving jurisdictional
interpretations. Second, the cases provide examples of the man-
ner in which this issue arises in practice. Third, the cases provide
a frame of reference for Section III's examination of the desirabil-
ity of Chevron deference in jurisdictional cases.
1. Supreme Court decisions deferring to the agency.
On a number of occasions, the Court has deferred to agency
interpretations of the agency's authority. In Japan Whaling Asso-
ciation v American Cetacean Society, Congress had required the
Secretary to certify any foreign country conducting fishing op-
erations in a manner that "diminish[ed] the effectiveness" of the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(ICRW).36 Though Japan had neither adopted quotas on the har-
vesting of sperm whales nor enforced a moratorium on commer-
cial whaling as required under the ICRW, the Secretary refused
to certify that Japan was violating the Act, claiming that the
statutory language gave him discretion over the decision. Citing
Chevron, the Court found the statute ambiguous and deferred to
the Secretary."
In City of New York v FCC,3" the Court deferred to the
FCC's determination that the mandate of the Cable Communica-
tions Policy Act of 1984 to "establish technical standards relating
3 478 US 221, 225 (1986).
' Id at 223 ("[Ihe Secretary's construction that there are circumstances in which
certification may be withheld... is also a reasonable construction of the language...
486 US 57 (1988).
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to the facilities and equipment of cable systems"39 not only au-
thorized the FCC to establish uniform technical standards for ca-
ble television, but also allowed the FCC to prohibit states from insti-
tuting more stringent standards. ° In deferring to the agency's
decision to preempt state law, the Court explained that "if the
agency's choice to pre-empt 'represents a reasonable accommo-
dation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's
care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation
is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.' "
These decisions illustrate a line of cases in which the Court
has deferred to the agency's interpretation of a statute within the
Chevron framework, despite the fact that each interpretation
affected the agency's jurisdiction. Any claim that deference
does not apply when the agency's interpretation delimits the
scope of its jurisdiction must either distinguish this class of cases
or show why the Court should depart from its settled practice.
This Comment does not attempt to distinguish these cases, as it
concludes that deference to jurisdictional interpretations is en-
tirely appropriate.
2. Supreme Court decisions reversing the agency's
interpretation.
When the Court has struck down agency interpretations
delimiting jurisdiction, it has done so at the "step one" stage of
3' Id at 61, citing 47 USC § 544(e) (1982 & Supp IV).
40 The Court did not explicitly apply the Chevron framework, but rather focused on
the question of preemption. However, the Court did defer to an agency's interpretation of
a statute that affected the scope of the agency's jurisdiction. 486 US at 63-64.
41 Id at 64, quoting United States v Shimer, 367 US 374, 383 (1961). The Court relied
mainly on negative inferences, holding that nothing in the history of the Act prohibited
the agency from asserting jurisdiction over this field. 486 US at 66-69.
42 See K Mart Corp. v Cartier, 486 US 281 (1988) (deferring to "common-control"
exception); Japan Whaling Association, 478 US 221 (deferring to Secretary of Commerces
interpretation of "diminish the effectiveness," giving the Secretary discretion over enforce-
ment proceedings); City of New York, 486 US 57 (deferring to the FCC's assertion of the
authority to preempt state law); Massachusetts v Morash, 490 US 107, 115-17 (1989)
(deferring to the Secretary of Labor's determination that vacation pay is not an employee
welfare benefit plan, which determined the scope of the agency's regulatory responsibili-
ties under ERISA); EEOC v Commercial Office Products Co., 486 US 107, 114 (1987)
(deferring to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII, which determined the agency's
authority to bring a civil rights enforcement action); NLRB v Food and Commercial
Workers United Union Local 23, 484 US 112 (1987) (deferring to the NLRB's interpreta-
tion of the NLRA, which determined the agency general counsel's authority to make post-
complaint informal settlement decisions). See also Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2098
n126 (cited in note 5) (collecting cases).
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the Chevron inquiry, finding a clear congressional intent that
contravened the agency's interpretation of the particular statute.
For example, in Dole v United Steelworkers of America," the
Office of Management and Budget claimed authority under the
provision of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 for reviewing
"information collection requests"" to review agency promulga-
tion of "disclosure rules."45 The Court, citing Chevron, found
that Congress unambiguously intended that a "disclosure rule"
was not an "information collection request."46 Justice White,
joined in dissent by Justice Rehnquist, found the issue ambigu-
ous and explicitly rejected the notion that the jurisdictional na-
ture of the statute should affect the Chevron analysis.47
In Adams Fruit Company, Inc. v Barrett, the Department of
Labor promulgated a regulation stating that where state workers'
compensation covers a migrant or seasonal worker, the state
program offers the exclusive remedy under the federal Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act." The Court
struck down this regulation, holding that as a matter of statutory
construction, Congress had in fact intended the Act to preempt
state laws making workers' compensation programs an exclusive
remedy.49 Because "Congress ha[d] expressly established the
Judiciary and not the Department of Labor as the adjudicator of
private rights of action arising under the statute," the Court
refused to defer to the agency's interpretation.0 It concluded by
noting that "it is fundamental 'that an agency may not bootstrap
itself into an area in which it has no jurisdiction."' 51
It is important to note that when the Court has overturned
the agency's interpretation, it has relied upon congressional in-
tent and the statutory text. It has not engaged in independent
review of a statute unless the statute has mandated that review.
This is consistent with Chevron. Significantly, applying Chevron
43 494 US 26 (1990).
"" Id at 34, quoting 44 USC § 3502(11) (1982 & Supp V) and 44 USC § 3502(4) (1982).
Information collection requests include "the obtaining or soliciting of facts by an agency
through... reporting or recordkeeping requirements... ." Id.
' 494 US at 43. Disclosure rules "require regulated entities to disclose informa-
tion... about what dangers exist and how these dangers can be avoided." Id at 28.
46 Id at 41.
41 Id at 43-55 (White dissenting).
48 494 US 638, 649 (1990), citing 29 CFR § 500.122(b) (1989).
49 494 US at 650-51.
60 Id at 649.
51 Id at 650, quoting Federal Maritime Commission v Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 US
726, 745 (1973).
1994]
The University of Chicago Law Review
deference to jurisdictional interpretations will not necessarily
allow agencies to expand their jurisdiction. The Court has not
hesitated to overturn agency assertions of authority as violative
of the intent of Congress.
C. Chevron and Jurisdiction in the Lower Courts
Lower courts have adopted varying approaches to the ques-
tion of Chevron's interaction with jurisdictional interpretations.
Some circuit court decisions have granted deference to an
agency's jurisdictional interpretation,52 while others have stated
that deference is not appropriate.53 Some circuits have vacillated
on the question,54 while others have acknowledged the issue as
unresolved by the Court and have explicitly reserved the ques-
tion.5
5
For example, the D.C. Circuit reserved the question in ACLU
v FCC.5" Before doing so, however, the D.C. Circuit stated that
"a pivotal distinction exists between statutory provisions that are
jurisdictional in nature-that is, provisions going to the agency's
power to regulate an activity or substance-and provisions that
are managerial-that is, provisions pertaining to the mechanics
5 See Transpacific Westbound Rate Agreement v Federal Maritime Commission, 951
F2d 950, 952-54 (9th Cir 1991) ("Because Congress has not directly addressed the issue of
the Commission's jurisdiction over mixed agreements, we must uphold the Commission's
analysis as long as it is reasonable [under Chevron]."); Board Of Governors Of The Univer-
sity Of North Carolina v United States Department of Labor, 917 F2d 812, 816 (4th Cir
1990) (Chevron deference "holds true as well for an agency's determination of its own
jurisdiction when that determination turns on the agency's findings of fact."); Puerto Rico
Maritime Shipping Authority v Valley Freight Systems, Inc., 856 F2d 546, 552 (3d Cir
1988) ("[Chevron's] rule of deference is fully applicable to an agency's interpretation of its
own jurisdiction.").
' See New York Shipping Association v Federal Maritime Commission, 854 F2d 1338,
1363 (DC Cir 1988) (Deference to an agency "would... be inappropriate" in interpreting
statutory provisions "delimiting its jurisdiction."); Air Courier Conference v United States
Postal Service, 959 F2d 1213, 1225-27 (3d Cir 1992) (Becker concurring) (suggesting that
deference is not always appropriate).
Compare The Business Roundtable v SEC, 905 F2d 406, 408 (DC Cir 1990) ("We
assume that we owe the Commission deference under Chevron [ I even though the case
might be characterized as involving a limit on the SEC's jurisdiction."), with New York
Shipping Association, 854 F2d at 1363 (Deference to an agency interpretation may be
"inappropriate" when it involves statutory provisions "delimiting its jurisdiction.").
' See United Transportation Union v United States, 987 F2d 784, 790 n 4 (DC Cir
1993); Lancashire Coal Co. v Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration,
968 F2d 388, 392-93 n 4 (3d Cir 1992); Puerto Rico Ports Authority v Federal Maritime
Commission, 919 F2d 799, 803 (1st Cir 1990); United States v 25 Cases, More or Less, of
an Article of Device, 942 F2d 1179, 1182-83 (7th Cir 1991).
66 823 F2d 1554 (DC Cir 1987).
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or inner workings of the regulatory process."57 Accordingly,
"[wihere the issue is one of whether a delegation of authority by
Congress has indeed taken place (and the boundaries of any such
delegation), rather than whether an agency has properly imple-
mented authority indisputably delegated to it, Congress can rea-
sonably be expected both to have and to express a clear in-
tent. ,8
The Third Circuit has been more receptive to the Chevron
doctrine in the jurisdictional context. In Air Courier v United
States Postal Service, the court deferred to the Postal Service's
claim that it had jurisdiction to set international postal rates
without input from the Postal Rate Commission."r The court
found Chevron deference appropriate despite the obviously juris-
dictional nature of the interpretation. Relying on Schor, the court
noted that the "Supreme Court has also held that an agency's
view of its own statutory jurisdiction may be entitled to deference
under Chevron."'° The court found that the "Postal Service's con-
struction of [the statute] to grant itself the power to establish
international postage rates is analogous to the [CFTC's] assertion
of jurisdiction over state-law counterclaims ... ."' In both cas-
es, "the regulatory body was construing the provisions of the act
that controlled its administrative powers."
6 2
In a concurrence, Judge Becker challenged the majority's
reading of Supreme Court precedent and suggested a different
rule: "[Algencies may be entitled to deference on jurisdictional
questions, especially where the statutory authorization is quite
broad, implying a congressional belief that the agency possesses
superior expertise in determining how to effectuate the statutory
purposes."' Under this view, Schor and Mississippi Power do
not provide a rule of general application, but rather rely on the
agency's superior expertise in the area in question and the long-
standing nature of the interpretation.' Chevron deference only
applies to jurisdictional questions when the factors supporting
the Chevron decision itself are applicable.
57 Id at 1567 n 32.
" Id. See also New York Shipping Association, 854 F2d at 1363.
69 959 F2d 1213 (3rd Cir 1992).
6 Id at 1223.
61 Id.
62 Id.
Id at 1225 (Becker concurring).
Id at 1226 ("As I read Schor, the Court only decided that, in light of the extremely
broad authorizing language of that statute, the CFTC had superior expertise in interpret-
ing the statute, even though the particular dispute focused a jurisdictional issue.").
1994] 967
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III. APPLYING THE DEFERENCE PRINCIPLE
As a descriptive matter, the Supreme Court has applied the
Chevron framework to agency interpretations that delimit the
agency's jurisdiction. This Section argues that, as a normative
matter, courts should defer to agency interpretations delimiting
the scope of the agency's authority. Two lines of argument sup-
port this proposition. On one hand, since courts cannot cogently
distinguish jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional interpretations,
failure to adopt a rule of deference for jurisdictional interpreta-
tions would undermine the core Chevron values of predictability
and consistency, and ultimately the Chevron doctrine itself. In
addition, since the benefits of agency expertise and certainty
outweigh concerns associated with agency self-dealing, deference
best accords with legislative intent and the rationales for the
Chevron doctrine.
A. Distinguishing Jurisdictional from Nonjurisdictional
Interpretations
If a court is to grant less deference to jurisdictional interpre-
tations than to other sorts of statutory interpretations by agen-
cies, it must of course be able to distinguish jurisdictional from
nonjurisdictional interpretations. If courts cannot draw a coher-
ent distinction, then deference is necessary to keep the Chevron
doctrine from slipping into an arbitrary exercise of judicial power.
The importance of, and difficulty in, making this distinction
has been well noted.' It is difficult to come up with a precise
definition of a "jurisdictional interpretation." Jurisdiction is a
malleable concept, and its definition depends upon the context in
which it is used. Black's Law Dictionary defines jurisdiction as
"the power of courts to inquire into facts, apply law, make deci-
sions, and declare judgment."86 The Court attempted to give a
definition of "jurisdictional facts" in Crowell v Benson: "In rela-
tion to administrative agencies, the question [of jurisdiction] in a
See Mississippi Power, 487 US at 381 (Scalia concurring); Steelworkers, 494 US at
54 (White dissenting). See also Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2097-2100 (cited in note 5)
(arguing that there should be no deference where an agency extends its authority "to an
entire category of cases," in an attempt to solve the problem of distinguishing jurisdic-
tional and nonjurisdictional interpretations); Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart,
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy: Problems, Text, and Cases 59-60 (Little,
Brown, 3d ed 1992) (discussing criticism of the jurisdictional fact doctrine of Crowell v
Benson).
" Black's Law Dictionary 853 (West, 6th ed 1990).
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given case is whether it falls within the scope of the authority
validly conferred." 7 Crowell might lead to a definition of juris-
dictional interpretation, on the following reasoning: Administra-
tive agencies can only act when authorized by Congress to do so.
For an administrative agency to exceed jurisdiction, it must as-
sert authority over an area that Congress has not delegated to
the agency. A jurisdictional interpretation, therefore, is an inter-
pretation which includes a determination by the agency that Con-
gress has delegated authority to the agency over an activity or
substance. However, Crowell's jurisdictional-fact doctrine has
fallen into disuse, largely because of the difficulty of distinguish-
ing jurisdictional facts from other facts."
Justice Scalia has argued that creating a cogent distinction
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional interpretations is
simply beyond the capacities of courts: "There is no discernible
line between an agency's exceeding its authority and an agency's
exceeding authorized application of its authority. To exceed au-
thorized application is to exceed authority."9 As Scalia noted,
"[v]irtually any administrative action can be characterized as
either the one or the other, depending on how generally one
wishes to describe the 'authority.' 70
The D.C. Circuit, by contrast, argued in ACLU v FCC that
courts can make a clear distinction between the two classes of in-
terpretations.7 There, the court held that a "pivotal distinction
exists between statutory provisions that are jurisdictional in na-
ture-that is, provisions going to the agency's power to regulate
an activity or substance-and provisions that are manageri-
al-that is, provisions pertaining to the mechanics or inner work-
ings of the regulatory process."72 Such a standard presupposes
that the distinction is workable in practice.
Professor Sunstein has suggested an intermediate position.
He argues that "Congress would be unlikely to want agencies to
have the authority to decide on the extent of their own powers.
67 285 US 22, 54 n 17 (1932).
6 The jurisdictional fact doctrine "has suffered much criticism, and doubts have often
been expressed by judges and commentators alike as to its continued vitality." Breyer and
Stewart, Administrative Law at 59, citing John Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial
Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U Pa L
Rev 1055 (1932); Bernard Schwartz, Does the Ghost of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U
Pa L Rev 163 (1949).
" Mississippi Power, 487 US at 381 (Scalia concurring).
70 Id.
71 823 F2d 1554.
7 Id at 1567 n 32.
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To accord such powers to agencies would be to allow them to be
judges of their own cause, in which they are of course susceptible
to bias."73 Although "agency expertise and accountability are
often relevant to the resolution of a jurisdictional ambiguity,"
Sunstein argues that the costs of bias outweigh these benefits.74
He concludes that "there is no magic in the word 'jurisdiction,'"
and that the correct inquiry is "whether the agency is seeking to
extend its legal power to an entire category of cases, rather than
disposing of certain cases in a certain way or acting in one or a
few cases."75 Although Sunstein admits that "[t]his distinction is
not always sharp" and "will call for an exercise in judgment," he
believes that "in the vast majority of cases, it is easily adminis-
tered."7
6
In attempting to distinguish jurisdictional from nonjurisdic-
tional interpretations, one should separate two types of jurisdic-
tional interpretations: those in which the agency is interpreting
language directly entrusted to the agency and those assertions of
authority that are not grounded in the statutory text. While the
textual line is not perfect, and gray areas are inevitable, it serves
both to focus those agency interpretations that are relevant to
the issue of Chevron deference and to illustrate the problems
inherent in distinguishing the jurisdictional from the
nonjurisdictional.
1. Extensions of jurisdiction not supported by the statutory
text.
There are two ways in which an agency might venture an
extension of jurisdiction not supported by the text of the statute.
However, both cases should prove easy for courts to handle, be-
cause in most cases courts will be able to resolve the question of
deference at step one of the Chevron inquiry.
First, an agency might assert authority over an activity or
substance not mentioned in the statutory text. For example, an
attempt by the EEOC to regulate cable TV would constitute an
unauthorized assertion of jurisdiction-if no statute entrusted to
7' Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2099 (cited in note 5).
74 Id at 2099-2100.
76 Id at 2100.
76 Id. Sunstein believes that problems of self-dealing weigh against deference on juris-
dictional issues, but he recognizes that an unworkable line may do more harm than good.
By limiting cases that will not receive deference to those that courts can clearly label
jurisdictional, Sunstein tempers his desire to limit agencies in this area with the practical
reality of the situation.
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the EEOC bore any reasonable relation to cable TV. Second, an
agency might assert jurisdiction over an activity or substance
when the statute explicitly restricts the jurisdiction of the agency
in that area. In Adams Fruit Co., for example, the Department of
Labor claimed adjudicatory authority over claims that the statute
had expressly reserved for the federal judiciary."
Courts can easily distinguish such text-ignoring interpreta-
tions from interpretations of language entrusted to the agency. A
court need only examine the statutory text to see whether the
agency is regulating a substance or activity found in the text or
whether the statute explicitly restricts the agency's jurisdiction.
For most of the agency interpretations that fall within this cate-
gory, the authority of the agency to issue the regulation will be
unambiguous. Here, the standard enunciated by the D.C. Circuit
is a workable one. A court can distinguish provisions "going to
the agency's power to regulate an activity or substance" and
"provisions pertaining to the mechanics or inner workings of the
regulatory process."78
This ability to distinguish assertions of jurisdiction that are
not supported by the statute from interpretations of statutory
language entrusted to the agency does not answer the question of
whether courts should apply Chevron deference to jurisdictional
interpretations. If Chevron does not apply, courts would indepen-
dently review the assertion of jurisdiction. If Chevron does apply,
courts would first ascertain the intent of Congress. If Congress
has expressly restricted the agency's jurisdiction, or if the agency
does not base its assertion of jurisdiction in the statutory text,
then courts will find that Congress did not intend for the agency
to have the asserted authority. For this class of interpretations,
therefore, whether or not Chevron applies to jurisdictional inter-
pretations will not affect the behavior of courts.
In other cases, the agency might have a plausible argument
that an extension of jurisdiction that is not expressly provided for
in the statutory text is nonetheless legitimate. In Schor, for ex-
ample, the CFTC claimed authority to adjudicate counterclaims
despite the statute's failure to mention counterclaims. 79 The Su-
preme Court, relying on the legislative history of the Act, held
that the CFTC had implicit authority to assert jurisdiction over
counterclaims, and upheld the CFTC's assertion of authority.
7 494 US 638.
78 ACLU v FCC, 823 F2d at 1567 n 32.
19 478 US 833.
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Schor indicates that generally a strong showing of legislative in-
tent-indeed, an unambiguous showing of legislative intent-will
be needed to rebut this presumption of no jurisdiction.8 0
2. Jurisdictional interpretations that result from defining
statutory terms entrusted to the agency.
In a second type of jurisdictional interpretation, the agency
increases or decreases the scope of its authority by defining stat-
utory language directly entrusted to the agency. Most jurisdic-
tional interpretations by agencies fall into this category.
When an agency interprets statutory language in a manner
that affects its jurisdiction, the court has something to focus on
other than an abstract jurisdictional question: the actual treat-
ment of the language. As long as this interpretation meets
Chevron's reasonableness requirement, the question of entrusting
it to the agency will implicate the policies Congress intended to
delegate when it enacted that language. Conversely, since every
regulation implicates the agency's authority to regulate as to the
specific matter involved, all nonjurisdictional interpretations
necessarily contain a jurisdictional element. Unless courts can
cogently separate the jurisdictional and the nonjurisdictional
elements within each interpretation, a court cannot, in some
sense, refuse to defer to the jurisdictional interpretation without
also refusing to defer to the nonjurisdictional aspects of the provi-
sion.
K Mart Corp. v Cartier, Inc. illustrates this problem.8 ' The
Tariff Act required the Customs Service to prohibit the impor-
tation of "gray-market goods."82 While the Customs Service's
regulations generally prohibited the entry of gray-market
goods,"3 they furnished a "'common-control' exception from the
'o Whether a text is ambiguous depends in part on the method of statutory interpre-
tation one adopts. Textualists look only to the statutory text to determine its meaning.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621 (1990). Other
methods of statutory interpretation examine legislative history in addition to the text.
The Chevron decision, while recognizing the importance of statutory interpretation to its
framework, leaves the question of what method of statutory interpretation to use unre-
solved. 467 US at 843 n 9. See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp., 892 F2d 105, 111 (DC Cir 1989). When there is no textual basis for the agency's
interpretation, one's view of statutory construction will only make a difference at the
margin.
81 486 US 281 (1988).
82 "A gray-market good is a foreign-manufactured good, bearing a valid United States
trademark, that is imported without the consent of the United States trademark holder."
Id at 285.
' The Customs Service regulation now in force provides generally that "[foreign
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ban, permitting the entry of gray-market goods manufactured
abroad by the trademark owner or its affiliate."' The regula-
tions also furnished an "authorized-use" exception, which per-
mitted the "importation of gray-market goods where '[tihe articles
of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name
applied under authorization of the U.S. owner' .... "8 K Mart
challenged the Customs Service for failing to exercise jurisdiction
over both classes of goods. 6 The Court deferred to the agency
and upheld the "common-control" exception, 7 but it overturned
the agency's regulation allowing the "authorized-use" exception
as contrary to the unambiguous intent of Congress.'
Congress intended the Customs Service to regulate gray-
market goods. In classifying certain goods as gray-market goods,
however, the agency necessarily expanded or restricted its juris-
diction. Some goods fall clearly within the statutory definition of
gray-market goods, and some goods are obviously beyond the
jurisdiction of the agency. 9 For other goods, it is ambiguous
whether they constitute gray-market goods. For example, the
Court held that it was ambiguous whether goods "manufactured
abroad by the trademark owner or its affiliate" constituted gray-
market goods ° The agency's decision that goods "manufactured
made] articles bearing a trademark identical with one owned and recorded by a citizen of
the United States or a corporation or association within the United States are subject to
seizure and forfeiture as prohibited importations." Id at 288, quoting 19 CFR § 133.21(b)
(1987).
486 US at 289, quoting 19 CFR § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1987).
486 US at 290, quoting 19 CFR § 133.21(c)(3).
This case presents an example of a case where the agency limits the scope of its ju-
risdiction. Professor Sunstein has argued that courts should not treat cases where an
agency limits its jurisdiction differently from cases where the agency expands its jurisdic-
tion. See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2099 (cited in note 5).
' 486 US at 291-94. In upholding the common-control exception, no opinion com-
manded a majority of the Court. Justice Brennan, writing for four justices, grounded his
decision in Chevron step one, holding the Custom Service's regulation was permissible
because Congress intended that application. Id at 300-12 (Brennan concurring). Justices
White and Kennedy concluded the regulations were "permissible constructions designed to
resolve statutory ambiguities." Id at 292.
The regulation granting the authorized-use exception failed a Chevron step-one
analysis. The Court held that "[ulnder no reasonable construction of the statutory lan-
guage can goods made in a foreign country by an independent foreign manufacturer be
removed from the purview of the statute." K Mart, 486 US at 294. For an examination of
the debate between the opinions of Justices Brennan and Scalia over the authorized-use
exception, see Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical
Introduction 108-10 (Chicago, 1991) (discussing the role changed circumstances should
play in evaluating the agency's "authorized-use exception").
'1 In K Mart, the Court held that goods under the Custom Service's "authorized-use"
exception fell within this category. See 486 US at 288.
90 Id at 289.
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abroad by the trademark owner or its affiliate" did not constitute
gray-market goods restricted the agency's jurisdiction, but it was
also a policy decision regarding the statutory scheme entrusted to
the agency. What constitutes a gray-market good today remains
ambiguous,9 and its definition is closely tied to the policies of
the Tariff Act. The agency cannot implement its policy of prohib-
iting gray-market goods if it cannot categorize such goods.
In order to determine whether courts can distinguish juris-
dictional from nonjurisdictional interpretations for purposes of
Chevron deference, it is important to identify where this distinc-
tion is relevant. Where the intent of Congress is clear, courts will
independently review the statute whether or not Chevron applies.
For example, even though Congress entrusted the Customs Ser-
vice with authority to regulate gray-market goods, the Customs
Service cannot declare all goods from Germany to be gray-market
goods and expect deference. Only where the congressional grant
of authority is ambiguous will the application of Chevron shift
interpretive power from the courts to the agencies. The ability of
courts to distinguish the jurisdictional from the nonjurisdictional,
therefore, is only relevant in this class of cases.
When the scope of the agency's authority is ambiguous, the
assertion of jurisdiction must be related to the inner workings or
policies of the statute entrusted to the agency. If the agency's
interpretation merely defined the power of the agency to regulate
an activity or substance, and did not pertain in any way to the
inner workings of the statute, then the assertion of jurisdiction
would fall into the first category of jurisdictional interpretations
described above.9" Courts that have adopted this distinction fail
to recognize that when the authority of the agency is ambiguous,
both types of provisions are present. It is not that courts are
incompetent to determine which interpretations are jurisdictional
and which ones are not. The problem is that the assertion of
" Farber and Frickey note:
When Congress imposed the import restriction .... trademarks served only to iden-
tify the origin of the goods, and any attempt to license a trademark could nullify it.
Hence, legislators could not have imagined how the statute would apply in a world in
which trademarks are readily transferable property interests.
Law and Public Choice at 109. Justice Brennan recognized that the statutory language
likely did not authorize a common-control exception from gray-market goods, but he also
noted that Congress wrote the statute fifty years ago, when trademark law was very dif-
ferent than it is today. KMart, 486 US at 300-12 (Brennan concurring).
2 See text accompanying notes 77-80.
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jurisdiction is at the same time a policy decision that is grounded
in the statutory text entrusted to the agency.
Where the authority of an agency is ambiguous, jurisdiction-
al interpretations will contain a jurisdictional and a
nonjurisdictional element. As a result, the viability of a rule
rejecting Chevron deference depends upon the ability of courts to
distinguish the jurisdictional from the nonjurisdictional within
this area of ambiguous authority. Courts cannot coherently make
this distinction for three reasons. First, many interpretations do
not have separate jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional elements,
but rather have one element that is both jurisdictional and
nonjurisdictional. Stating that a good is not a gray-market good
is both a jurisdictional and policy determination. Or, when the
EPA adopted a plant-wide definition of stationary source in Chev-
ron, the agency both increased its jurisdiction and furthered its
policy of regulating pollution emissions. A court cannot pass on
the jurisdictional question without also passing on the policy
decision. Since all interpretations have a jurisdictional compo-
nent, a rule of no deference for jurisdictional interpretations
would undermine the Chevron doctrine.
Second, an attempt to separate out cases that have a strong
jurisdictional element would not fare much better. Tying the rule
of deference to the strength of the jurisdictional element of the
provision invites incoherent and arbitrary decisions. Clear lines
are highly unlikely in inquiries concerning the degree of the
jurisdictional impact. The greater the jurisdictional nature of the
statute, the more likely it is the intent of Congress is unambigu-
ous. Ambiguity only arises when the jurisdictional element is
intertwined with the political. Removing Chevron deference when
a statute raises substantial jurisdictional questions, therefore,
fails to resolve the problem.
Finally, history has shown the difficulties inherent in sepa-
rating jurisdictional issues from non-jurisdictional issues. The
jurisdictional-fact doctrine of Crowell v Benson has been discred-
ited, and the Supreme Court's abandonment of the doctrine was
a direct result of the inability of courts to distinguish jurisdiction-
al facts from nonjurisdictional ones. 3 Professor Sunstein's at-
tempt to distinguish jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional inter-
pretations also fails to provide an acceptable solution. Problems
arise with efforts to draw a line at a "class or category of cases."
Most agency interpretations will involve a category of cases and
" Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2099 (cited in note 5).
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not simply "one or a few cases."94 Unless a "category of cases"
can be meaningfully contained, the standard would remove most
interpretations from the Chevron framework. More importantly,
it is by no means clear that a "category of cases" would serve as a
sufficient proxy for "unauthorized assertion of jurisdiction." In
many cases, Congress will grant the agency authority over a
category or class of cases. When the EPA adopted a plant-wide
definition of stationary source, it did so for the entire class of
pollution-emitting plants. The Customs Service "common control
exception" also covered a class of goods. By limiting the inquiry
to whether the interpretation asserts jurisdiction over a category
of cases, Sunstein bypasses the fundamental question of how to
determine which assertions of jurisdiction over a category of
cases are permissible.
In short, carving an exception from the Chevron doctrine for
jurisdictional interpretations depends in the first instance upon
the ability of courts to distinguish jurisdictional from
nonjurisdictional interpretations. In making this determination,
one must find that class of cases where the application of Chev-
ron deference will make a difference. Application of the Chevron
doctrine only changes the locus of interpretive power when the
agency is interpreting language entrusted to the agency and the
scope of the agency's authority is ambiguous. While courts can
distinguish some classes of jurisdictional interpretations from
others, they cannot do so in that category of cases that are rele-
vant to the question of Chevron deference. As a result, creating
an exception from the Chevron doctrine ultimately undermines
the doctrine itself.
B. Deference and the Rationales for the Chevron Doctrine
Putting to one side the question of whether courts can distin-
guish jurisdictional from nonjurisdictional interpretations, the
"' Of the cases examined in Section II, only in Japan Whaling Association can one
say that the interpretation did not cover a class of cases. Steelworkers involved an asser-
tion ofjurisdiction over a category of rules-disclosure rules. City of New York involved an
assertion of jurisdiction over a class of state laws. K Mart involved classes of goods
exempted from the requirements accompanying gray-market goods, and Schor involved a
class of claims. To the extent that any of the above cases can be characterized as not
covering a class or category, the fact that they can easily be characterized as one or the
other suggests that the standard has no teeth and provides no coherent basis for courts to
distinguish cases. Whenever an agency engages in rulemaking, it will likely act to regu-
late a class or category of cases. The fact that the agency needs to promulgate a "rule"
suggests that it contemplates enforcement over many actors.
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question remains whether courts should do so. This question is
one of interpretive power: Should courts or administrative agen-
cies interpret ambiguous statutes when the interpretation in-
volves the scope of the agency's jurisdiction? A canon of statutory
construction holds that those empowered by law should not be
permitted to determine the scope of that limitation," and some
have argued that this canon should trump Chevron deference in
jurisdictional interpretations.' The issue, however, is a narrow-
er one. The question is not whether courts should defer to all asser-
tions of jurisdiction by agencies. The question, post-Chevron, is
whether courts should defer to an agency's assertion of jurisdic-
tion when the authority of the agency is ambiguous and the
agency's interpretation is a reasonable one.
The default-rule rationale for Chevron, advocated by Justice
Scalia, strongly supports application of the deference principle to
jurisdictional interpretations.97 Under this view, the important
thing is that Congress knows who will interpret the statutory
ambiguities it creates when it passes legislation. Since jurisdic-
tional interpretations are intertwined with policy decisions, any
attempt to separate the two will inevitably lead to more uncer-
tainty and inconsistency than under a uniform rule of deference.
If courts cannot coherently separate the jurisdictional from the
nonjurisdictional, Congress will no longer know who will resolve
statutory ambiguities. Only a uniform rule of deference can
maintain Chevron's core values of consistency and uniformity.98
If agency interpretations were either purely jurisdictional or
purely nonjurisdictional, and courts could distinguish the two,
then the separation-of-powers rationale for Chevron would sup-
port a rule giving courts the power to interpret statutory ques-
tions of jurisdiction." Indeed, Crowell v Benson held that sepa-
ration of powers requires courts to determine jurisdictional facts.
Yet in a world where policy decisions are intertwined with an
agency's jurisdictional interpretation, separation of powers sup-
ports Chevron deference because agencies, which are more politi-
cally accountable than courts, should make the policy determina-
tions.
See Singer, 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction at § 65.02 (cited in note 5).
See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2098 (cited in note 5).
See text accompanying notes 12-13.
It also provides Congress with the incentive to clearly demarcate the agency's au-
thority. Moreover, Congress can always revise the statutory language to restrict the
agency's authority if it did not intend for the agency to regulate in a given area.
" See text accompanying note 14.
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The most widely accepted view of Chevron grounds the deci-
sion in legislative intent and the belief that "[ilf Congress has ex-
plicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delega-
tion of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of
the statute by regulation." 0 Under this view, Chevron defer-
ence allows agencies to make policy decisions, but jurisdictional
questions are questions of law, not policy, and Congress did not
intend for courts to defer on questions of law. Despite this tradi-
tional understanding, this rationale for Chevron also supports a
uniform rule of deference.
1. The intent of Congress.
Courts can divine congressional intent concerning some juris-
dictional interpretations. Congress does intend for an agency to
have jurisdiction over a general area. It also intends that the
agency will not have jurisdiction over areas foreign to the stat-
ute.' In the gray area between these two extremes, the intent
of Congress is ambiguous. The question of Chevron deference is
only relevant in this gray area. For this category of cases, the
question is not "what did Congress intend?" By definition, the
intent of Congress is ambiguous. The relevant question is wheth-
er Congress intends for the courts or the administrative agencies
to have the power to resolve jurisdictional ambiguities. Since
members of Congress have probably never considered the issue,
one must ask what Congress would intend if it had considered
the issue.
A textualist approach to statutory interpretation holds that
courts should only seek the intent of Congress in the language
Congress enacts.' 2 Since the textualist regards congressional
intent as a fiction, it is of no moment that Congress never con-
sidered whether courts should apply Chevron to jurisdictional
interpretations. A textualist is only concerned with whether the
particular statute's language grants the agency authority. Under
this view, similar to that of Judge Becker in Air Courier, courts
should grant more deference when the statute contains broad
jurisdictional language.0 3 Judge Becker also noted that courts
10 Chevron, 467 US at 843-44. See text accompanying note 15.
101 For example, Congress clearly did not intend the EEOC to regulate cable TV.
1" For an examination of the textualist approach, see Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev 621
(cited in note 80).
10 See Air Courier, 959 F2d at 1225 (Becker concurring) ("[A]gencies may be entitled
to deference on jurisdictional questions, especially where the statutory authorization is
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may also examine other factors in making individualized defer-
ence determinations, such as the expertise of the agency, or the
long-standing nature of the regulation. °4
There are two problems with the textualist view. First, it
represents a return to the multi-factor approach that dominated
the Supreme Court's analysis of agency interpretations of stat-
utes prior to Chevron.'° The multi-factor approach produced a
system of confusion and inconsistency.. and was the major im-
petus behind the Court's decision to adopt a uniform rule of def-
erence in Chevron. Second, ambiguities will still arise under a
textualist approach, and textualism does not speak to who should
have interpretive power when the statute is ambiguous. To say
that courts can resolve all jurisdictional questions by reference to
the statute is simply another way of saying courts will not defer
to agencies in the case of jurisdictional ambiguities. If Congress
presumably intends for agencies to interpret ambiguities in
nonjurisdictional interpretations, some affirmative reasons must
be put forward as to why the intent changes when jurisdictional
questions arise. Textualism does not provide the necessary dis-
tinction.
While Congress does have intentions regarding some juris-
dictional limits for agencies, almost by definition it does not have
an intent when the scope of the agency's authority is ambiguous.
To ask what Congress intended, therefore, is to ask the wrong
question. One must focus on whether courts or agencies are bet-
ter situated to make the jurisdictional interpretation. Two consid-
erations are especially relevant: agency expertise and the prob-
lem of self-dealing.
quite broad, implying a congressional belief that the agency possesses superior expertise
in determining how to effectuate the statutory purposes.").
104 Id at 1226-27. See also Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v Primary Steel, Inc., 497 US
116 (1990); Comment, Precedents Construing Statutes Administered by Federal Agencies
After the Chevron Decision: What Gives?, 60 U Chi L Rev 223 (1993).
" See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L J
969, 972 (1992) ("RIln deciding what degree of deference to give an executive interpreta-
tion, the Court relied on an eclectic cluster of considerations .... The default rule was
one of independent judicial judgment. Deference to the agency interpretation was appro-
priate only if a court could identify some factor or factors that would supply an affir-
mative justification for giving special weight to the agency views.").
1" See Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v Dellaventura, 544 F2d 35, 49 (2d Cir 1976) (cita-
tions omitted), aff'd as Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v Caputo, 432 US 249 (1977)
(Judge Friendly acknowledged confusion over when deference was appropriate.); Merill,
101 Yale L J at 972 ("Admittedly, the factors tended to be invoked unevenly.").
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2. Agency expertise.
Agency expertise is an important factor in justifying Chevron
deference. If agencies do not have an institutional advantage over
courts in interpreting statutes, little purpose would be served by
the Chevron doctrine. 1 7 Once again, one must give the inquiry
a sharper focus. The issue is not whether the federal courts have
a greater expertise in interpreting grants of jurisdiction. Perhaps
they do. But the issue is, once the federal courts have found the
grant of jurisdiction to be ambiguous, do courts or agencies have
greater expertise in resolving the ambiguity?
The traditional view holds that courts are experts on ques-
tions of law while agencies are experts on questions of policy, and
to ascertain the intent of Congress is to resolve a legal question.
Since the statute is ambiguous, however, there is no intent of
Congress. The court's greatest area of expertise is of little help
once the court declares the statute ambiguous. While courts may
have some expertise in determining how to resolve an ambiguity
in the scope of the agency's authority, since there is no congres-
sional intent, and since questions of agency policy are involved,
the court's expertise is greatly diminished.
Agency expertise supports application of a rule of deference
to jurisdictional determinations for two reasons. First, to the
extent a court cannot disentangle questions of law from questions
of policy in jurisdictional interpretations, the benefits of agency
expertise for policy questions apply to jurisdictional interpreta-
tions as well. Courts only have a comparative advantage over
agencies in interpreting language delimiting jurisdiction if courts
can separate jurisdictional issues from nonjurisdictional ones.
Given the inevitable overlap in this area, courts should grant
more deference to the agency's expertise.
Second, an agency's expertise is "relevant to the resolution of
a jurisdictional ambiguity."' As Sunstein notes, "whether the
[CFTC] has adjudicative authority over common law counter-
claims might well depend upon the consequences of the exercise
of that authority for the fair and efficient administration of the
1 Chevron itself suggests that agency expertise is an important consideration:
The principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently
followed by this Court whenever... a full understanding of the force of the statutory
policy in a given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respect-
ing the matters subjected to agency regulations.
467 US at 844 (quotations omitted).
" See Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev at 2099-2100 (cited in note 5).
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Commodity Exchange Act.""9 In many cases, an agency does
not assert authority over a substance or activity solely to increase
its authority; it does so because the assertion of jurisdiction fur-
thers the policy of the act entrusted to the agency. The agency's
expertise is highly relevant to this policy determination.
Agency expertise is especially relevant when an agency's
interpretation restricts its jurisdiction."0 Agencies have limited
resources. An agency without the funds to fully carry out its
statutory mandate must pick and choose among competing alter-
natives. The agency's knowledge of where the resources will be
most productive is extremely relevant in deciding how to allocate
funding. A court lacks the knowledge and capabilities to make
such allocations. It may suffer from tunnel vision and pay too
much attention to the cases before it without adopting a systemic
perspective. Where the statutory requirements are unclear,
courts should not engage in the enterprise of requiring agency
action.
3. Self-dealing.
Even if the agency's expertise is greater than that of the
courts, the benefits of that expertise must be weighed against the
potential costs that may arise from agency self-dealing or aggran-
dizement. Commentators have cited self-dealing concerns as a
primary reason for denying agencies deference for jurisdictional
questions, even given superior agency expertise."' It has been
suggested that "our system of checks and balances does not allow
government agencies to judge the scope of their own authori-
ty,""2 and that agency "aggrandizement" occurs when the agen-
cy has a "substantial and obvious institutional interest in its inter-
pretation.""' The fear is that in questions of jurisdiction, the
agency's self-interest will inappropriately influence the agency's
decision.
10 Id at 2100.
" Professor Sunstein argues that courts should treat cases where the agency restricts
its jurisdiction in the same manner as when agencies expand their authority. See id ("It
should also follow that agencies will not receive deference when they are denying their
authority to deal with a large category of cases.").
... See id at 2099-2100 ("Moreover, agency expertise and accountability are often rele-
vant to the resolution of a jurisdictional ambiguity."); Note, Coring the Seedless Grapes: A
Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S-.A v. NRDC, 87 Colum L Rev 986 (1987).
112 See Note, 87 Colum L Rev at 1006 & n 147, citing Addison v Holly Hill Fruit Prod-
ucts, 322 US 607, 616 (1944).
113 Note, 87 Colum L Rev at 1006.
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The concern that an agency will always act to increase its
authority is unjustified. In many of the cases before the Supreme
Court that involved the agency's jurisdiction, the agency had in
fact acted to restrict the scope of its authority."' This fact sug-
gests that in areas of ambiguous authority, the agency is more
concerned with carrying out the polices of the statute than its
own power.
Admittedly, the possibility of agency self-dealing carries
costs. But several factors constrain these costs. First, since courts
will only defer to the agency when the scope of the agency's au-
thority is ambiguous, and since the agency's assertion of jurisdic-
tion must also be reasonable, the structure of the Chevron doc-
trine places significant restraints on the agency's ability to in-
crease its jurisdiction. Second, Congress or the President can act
to restrain the authority of an agency whenever either branch
believes the agency has overstepped its bounds. Congressional
committees stay in close contact with their administrative coun-
terparts-statutory ambiguities that result in unjustified asser-
tions of jurisdiction are not likely to remain ambiguous for long.
Even if the political restraints are not entirely effective, they
provide another institutional restraint that lessens the probabili-
ty of self-dealing behavior. Given these restraints, the costs of
self-dealing probably do not outweigh the substantial benefits of
agency expertise. Even if the benefits of agency expertise are
roughly equivalent to the costs of agency self-dealing, the addi-
tional benefits associated with uniformity of application suggest
that courts should defer to the agencies." 5
CONCLUSION
Courts should not carve out an exception to the Chevron
doctrine for agency interpretations that delimit the agency's
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has consistently followed the
Chevron framework when it has analyzed agency interpretations
that delimit the agency's authority. Application of the Chevron
doctrine only changes the locus of interpretive power when the
Congressional grant of authority is ambiguous. In this class of
cases, courts are incapable of distinguishing jurisdictional from
nonjurisdictional interpretations, since within this category the
14 See, for example, KMart, 486 US 281; Morash, 490 US at 115-17.
.. But see Merrill, 101 Yale L J 969 (cited in note 105) (questioning whether Chevron
has in fact resulted in consistent and predictable outcomes by courts).
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interpretation is simultaneously jurisdictional and nonjurisdic-
tional. Most importantly, the rationales for the original Chevron
decision apply with equal or greater force to jurisdictional inter-
pretations. Courts, therefore, have no reason to upset the current
regime by bifurcating the rule of deference.

